Well, I've built a bunch of mobile banking apps and we did detect if the phone was rooted, was in dev mode, etc. and it is not because we were "stupid, consumer-hostile, and anti-competitive".

If someone steals the secrets from a rooted phone and steals customer's money the bank is on the hook, so banks do everything they can to minimize this risk.

There is no way to store customer's secrets in a PC browser securely, so all the "dangerous" transactions were outright prohibited in the web app or made available only via temporary QR login.

All this is just is a negative side effect of customer protection laws.

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elric a day ago | parent | next [-]

These practices are strengthening the Google/Apple hegemony and are ultimately damaging user freedoms and consumer protections. I'm sure that's not your employer's intention, but it is a negative thing that they're contributing to. And because of how essential banking is, banks have a big thumb on this particular scale, and I wish they'd use it for good rathet than for enriching and entrenching evil.

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Zak a day ago | parent | prev | next [-]

I understand (but vehemently oppose) the argument for root detection. What risks to banks see from having developer settings enabled?

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izacus a day ago | parent | prev | next [-]

> If someone steals the secrets from a rooted phone and steals customer's money the bank is on the hook, so banks do everything they can to minimize this risk.

Now that's just not true now, is it? Sure the lawyers told you that (the ones that get paid to tell you that), but nowhere in EU was a bank actually fined for not root checking a device.

They were plenty fined by being utterly incompetent with security practices and doing them poorly - like trying to inject wierd .SOs to do the root detection you're defending.

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mike_hearn a day ago | parent | next [-]

Literally three days ago: https://www.complianceweek.com/regulatory-policy/eu-agrees-r...

"Payment service providers (PSPs) operating in the EU will have to cover customers’ losses from fraud if their fraud protection regimes are inadequate or poorly implemented under new EU rules."

Other places like the UK had such rules already.

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izacus 16 hours ago | parent [-]

Note how this says nothing about root lockout.

The fact that no root lockout means "inadequate protection" is something you projected onto this statement and that's the part I'm addressing in my comment.

No one actually got fined for root protection specifically.

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mike_hearn 14 hours ago | parent [-]

Regulators love vague standards like "inadequate protection" because it means they can implement a ratchet effect without needing to understand anything or constantly rewrite the laws. If someone gets hurt they just look around at whatever the competition is doing, pick the most extreme thing, and declare that any other standard is inadequate.

So sure, if you want to not use security tactics your competitors are using and then try to lawyer out of it by arguing, "it didn't specifically say we had to do that" in front of the EU Commission, go ahead. But don't blame the banks that are more realistic about how this works.

	▲	izacus 11 hours ago \| parent [-]
		Yeah, so you admit there's no real legal basis for those kind of restrictions. Which anyone of us who worked with banks, mobile, banking security and their legal already knew. They're a source of greatest security hits like "let's use SMS for only auth for web banking" after all. But what's really hiding behind all your fluff is something else: Abusing users with root lockouts is EASY for the programmers at banks. The auditors have a checkbox "root lockout" and they tick the box. Legal ticks the box. CISO ticks the box. All happy, who cares about user. That's what this is all about. The insulting thing is trying to sell it like some kind of security feature.

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Aspos a day ago | parent | prev [-]

No bank got fined for not root checking, correct. However banks are on the hook for unauthorized transactions. And "unauthorized" means different thing in different countries.

In some jurisdictions if bank can prove that transaction was made with customer's key then customer can not demand their money back. That's the best case, but there are only few of such jurisdictions and even there the burden of proof is on the bank and it costs a lot.

In other jurisdictions bank must reverse a transaction even if it was proven that the transaction was signed with a legitimate key, but the key _may_ have been stolen.

In some jurisdictions (i.e U.S.) banks are required to reverse a transaction at a customer’s request, even if the customer does not dispute having made the transaction.

In any case dealing with all this is too expensive and risky.

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izacus 11 hours ago | parent [-]

> In any case dealing with all this is too expensive and risky.

[Citation needed]

How much does it cost? How risky?

	▲	Aspos 7 hours ago \| parent [-]
		Let's say you are a bank and you make $10 on each $100K transfer. If customer disputes a transaction and you must return the money, you lose the whole amount and twice as much on lawyers, internal audit, compliance people working on the case. With this math you can't afford the risk if it is more than 1 in 30000. For many European banks the math is even more brutal.

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abdullahkhalids a day ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Why don't banks just make desktop computer applications?

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Aspos a day ago | parent | next [-]

Practically impossible to store secrets in a desktop app too. Besides, customers would not willing to install a desktop app. And those who would, will require support.

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mike_hearn a day ago | parent | prev | next [-]

PC platforms don't have remote attestation infrastructure working.

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elric a day ago | parent | next [-]

And surprisingly I can pay securely using my PC, fully rooted, on FOSS software. Hardware tokens have been a thing for decades. There are more second (or third) factor authentication and signing solutions than I can enumerate.

Do peope get defrauded using online banking? Sure. But usually not in a way that would be stopped by secure attestation.

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mike_hearn a day ago | parent | next [-]

The hardware token is itself a form of remote attestation. The reason you need extra hardware is because the PC can't do it.

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Magnusmaster a day ago | parent | prev [-]

Most banks don't know hardware tokens are a thing. They want everyone to use their app.

	▲	elric a day ago \| parent [-]
		Is this yet more evidence of how utterly broken US banks are? Assuming you are referring to US banks. For the past 20 or so years, every bank I've been with in Belgium has provided me with one of three types of hardware token: 1. An OTP token that's just a screen that displays a new 6 digit token every couple of seconds (haven't seen one of these in a few years now). This was used to supplement username/password on login and to verify every bank transfer. 2. A token with a screen and a display, which generates OTPs based on input. E.g. for a payment the bank would tell me to enter the amount + the last N digits of the bank account, the token then generates an OTP, which I can use to confirm the payment. That's what 2 of my 3 banks currently use. They have separate modes for logging in, for signing bank transfers, for signing 3D Secure online payments, etc. 3. A card reader where where I just slot in my card. I can then log in or sign payments using the card's chip & pin. This is what my third bank uses. There are a couple of variants on this, such as models which connect with USB and models which can read QR codes from your screen so you don't have to tap in anything except for your PIN.

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a day ago | parent | prev [-]

[deleted]

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elric a day ago | parent | prev [-]

They used to, and some still kind of do, but no longer for consumers.

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realusername 17 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

Great, so the no-name iPhone clone in China passes your test but EOS doesn't.

There's no way to assess the security of a rom from an app and it's about time that banks learn this reality.

Software on mobile is even more fragmented and less standardized than on desktop