Every docker image specified in a k8s yml or docker-compose file or github action that doesn’t end in :sha256@<hash> (ie specifying a label) is one “docker push” away from a compromise, given that tags/labels are not cryptographically specified. You’re just trusting DockerHub and the publisher (or anyone with their creds) to not rug you.

The industry runs on a lot more unexamined trust than people think.

They’re deployed automatically by machine, which definitionally can’t even give it a second thought. The upstream trust is literally specified in code, to be reused constantly automatically. You could get owned in your sleep without doing anything just because a publisher got phished one day.

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ChrisMarshallNY 5 hours ago | parent | next [-]

That's one reason I barely use any dependencies. I'm forced to use a couple, but I tend to "roll my own," quite a bit.

Well, I should qualify that. I do use quite a few dependencies, but they are ones that I wrote.

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embedding-shape 4 hours ago | parent [-]

Requiring the use of lockfiles and strict adherence to checking updates, also helps. I tend to use dependencies for many things, but ones I've trusted over a long time, I know how they work, often chosen because of how they were implemented, so I can see the updates and review them myself. Scaling up to a team, you make that part of the process whenever you add a new dependencies, and someone's name always have to be "assigned" to a dependency, so people take ownership of the code that gets added. Often people figure out it's not worth it, and figure out a simpler way.

	▲	ChrisMarshallNY 2 hours ago \| parent [-]
		That sounds like a great policy.

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Muromec 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

I have to trust the publisher, otherwise I can't update and I have to update because CVE's exist. If we step back, how do I even know that the image blessed with hardcoded hash (doublechecked with the website of whoever is supposed to publish it) isn't backdored now?

	▲	sneak 3 hours ago \| parent [-]
		Because it has been out and published and used for weeks/months. The longer an artifact is public and in use, the less chance it has of being malicious.

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OptionOfT 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

Pinning a GitHub Actions action doesn't prevent the action itself from doing an apt install, npm install or running a Docker image that is not pinned.