| ▲ | tracker1 3 hours ago | |||||||||||||
Yeah, I've gotten headway in this in other places I've worked... heavy advocate for the only requirement being a minimum length with the recommendation to use a "phrase" as well as not requiring rotation in terms of less than a year at a time if at all... though not strictly matching NIST, some ops find a never require change hard to swallow. I wrote an authentication platform used by a few govt agencies. The irony is all my defaults match NIST guidelines (including haveibeenpwned lookup on password set/change), but needed to support the typical overrides for other hard requirements that tend to come from such agencies in practice. | ||||||||||||||
| ▲ | thaumasiotes 3 hours ago | parent [-] | |||||||||||||
>> Verifiers and CSPs SHALL NOT require subscribers to change passwords periodically. However, verifiers SHALL force a change if there is evidence that the authenticator has been compromised. > though not strictly matching NIST, some ops find a never require change hard to swallow. I think they're right about that. A scheduled change just represents the accumulating probability that there's been a compromise somewhere that didn't come to your attention. It seems like it would make more sense for a scheduled change to affect all passwords at once, though. | ||||||||||||||
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