Last week I accidentally exposed my OpenAI, Anthropic, and Gemini keys. They somehow ended up in Claude Code logs(!) Within seconds I got an email from Anthropic and they have already disabled my keys. Neither OpenAI nor Google alerted me in anyway. I was able to login to OpenAI and delete all the keys quickly.

Took me a good 10-15 minutes to _just_ _find_ where Gemini/AI Studio/Vortex projects keys _might_ be! I had to "import project" before I could find where the key is. Google knew key was exposed but the key seemed to be still active with a "!" next to it!

With a lot of vibe coding happening, key hygiene becomes crucial on both issuer and user ends.

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ChrisMarshallNY 2 days ago | parent | next [-]

> With a lot of vibe coding happening

I shudder to think of the implications.

Consider all the security disasters we already get from brogramming, and multiply that, times 100.

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throwawaysleep 2 days ago | parent [-]

Security simply doesn’t seem like it matters much based on the mild consequences.

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rainonmoon 2 days ago | parent [-]

Try working at a company of any remote public significance and see if your view changes.

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Nextgrid a day ago | parent | next [-]

There's a lot of performative "security" in such companies. You need to employ the right people (you need a "CISO", ideally someone who's never actually used a terminal in their life), you need to pay money for the right vendors, adopt the right buzzwords and so on. The amounts of money being spent on performative security are insane, all done by people who can't even "hack" a base64-"encrypted" password.

All while there's no budget for those that actually develop and operate the software (so you get insecure software), those that nevertheless do their best are slowed down by all the security theater, and customer service is outsourced to third-world boiler rooms so exploiting vulnerabilities doesn't even matter when a $100 bribe will get you in.

It's "the emperor has no clothes" all the way down: because any root-cause analysis of a breach (including by regulators) will also be done by those without clothes, it "works" as far as the market and share price is concerned.

Source: been inside those "companies of public significance" or interacted with them as part of my work.

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throwawaysleep 2 days ago | parent | prev [-]

Equifax? Capital One? 23andMe? My basis for this is that you can leak everyone’s bank data and barely have it show up in your stock price chart, especially long term.

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rainonmoon 2 days ago | parent | next [-]

Stock price is an extremely narrow view of the total consequences of lax cybersecurity but that aside, the notion that security doesn’t matter because those companies got hacked is ridiculous. The reason there isn’t an Equifax every minute is because an enormous amount of effort and talent goes into ensuring that’s the case. If your attitude is we should vibe code our way past the need for security, you aren’t responsible enough to hold a single user’s data.

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ChrisMarshallNY 2 days ago | parent [-]

I feel as if security is a much bigger concern than it ever was.

The main issue seems to be, that our artifacts are now so insanely complex, that there’s too many holes, and modern hackers are quite different from the old skiddies.

In some ways, it’s possible that AI could be a huge boon for security, but I’m worried, because its training data is brogrammer crap.

	▲	Nextgrid a day ago \| parent [-]
		Security has become a big talking point, and industry vultures have zeroed in on that and will happily sell dubious solutions that claim to improve security. There is unbelievable money sloshing around in those circles, even now during the supposed tech downturn ("security" seems to be immune to this). Actual security on the other hand has decreased. I think one of the worst things to happen to the industry is "zero trust", meaning now any exposed token or lapse in security is exploitable by the whole world instead of having to go through a first layer of VPN (no matter how weak it is, it's better than not having it). > quite different from the old skiddies Disagreed - if you look at the worst breaches ("Lapsus$", Equifax, etc), it was always down to something stupid - social engineering the vendor that conned them into handing them the keys to the kingdom, a known vulnerable version in a Java web framework, yet another NPM package being compromised and that they immediately updated to since the expensive, enterprise-grade Dependabot knockoff told them to, and so on. I'm sure APTs and actual hacking exists in the right circles, but it's not the majority of breaches. You don't need APT to breach most companies.

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ChrisMarshallNY 2 days ago | parent | prev [-]

I don't know if 23andMe has done so well, but many of their problems stem from a bad business model, as opposed to that awful breach.

I agree that we need to have "toothier" breach consequences.

The problem is that there's so much money sloshing around, that we have regulatory capture.

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duxup a day ago | parent | prev | next [-]

>Took me a good 10-15 minutes to _just_ _find_ where Gemini/AI Studio/Vortex projects keys _might_ be

I feel like all this granular key management across everything, dev, life, I might be more insecure but god damn I don't feel like I know what is going on.

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varenc 2 days ago | parent | prev [-]

How did they get leak them? Just someone getting into your personal Claude Code logs? I'm surprised that if it was just that Google would even be aware they're leaked.

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dnw 2 days ago | parent [-]

Claude was looking up env-vars during the coding session which ended up in ~/.claude/projects/ log. I wanted to make the [construction] logs public with the code. Didn't think that was a leak vector.

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hippo22 a day ago | parent | next [-]

How would Google or OpenAI have alerted you? Anthropic could alert you because they scraped their keys and detected on of their keys in the logs. If anything, it’s bad that Anthropic only notified you about their key, and not the other keys that have leaked.

	▲	dnw 2 hours ago \| parent [-]
		They all partner with Github to detect leaked credentials. In order to have API keys I need to have an account with each service with a valid email. So all three of them had the same information and channels available to reach me. It wouldn't have mattered how the keys got leaked, in the current setup Anthropic would have reached me first and deactivated my key. Claude (or other LLMs, for that matter) wouldn't know they leaked the keys because I did, by trying to make the construction logs public. I just wasn't expecting the logs to have keys in them from my env vars.

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fatata123 2 days ago | parent | prev [-]

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