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| ▲ | _alternator_ 3 days ago | parent | next [-] |
| Human brains and experiences seem to be constrained by the laws of quantum physics, which can be simulated to arbitrary fidelity on a computer. Nit sure where Godel’s incompleteness theory would even come in here… |
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| ▲ | Mehvix 3 days ago | parent [-] | | how are we going to deduce/measure/know the initialization and rules for consciousness? do you see any systems as not encodable/simulatable by quantum? | | |
| ▲ | _alternator_ 2 days ago | parent [-] | | I think you are asking whether consciousness might be a fundamentally different “thing” from physics and thus hard or impossible to simulate. I think there is abundant evidence that the answer is ‘no’. The main reason is that consciousness doesn’t give you new physics, it follows the same rules and restrictions. It seems to be “part of” the standard natural universe, not something distinct. |
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| ▲ | squidbeak 3 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Brain damage? If thought was outside physics, it would be a bit more durable than Humpty Dumpty. |
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| ▲ | gowld 3 days ago | parent | prev [-] |
| Please explain, because this interpetation of "Godel" is highly nonstandard. |
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| ▲ | Mehvix 3 days ago | parent [-] | | you may consider reading I am a strange loop for that, which can do far better justification than myself if there's surely no algo to solve the halting problem, why would there be maths that describes consciousness? | | |
| ▲ | josh-sematic 3 days ago | parent [-] | | Can you look at any arbitrary program and tell if it halts without running it indefinitely? If so, you should explain how and collect your Nobel. Telling everybody whether the Collatz conjecture is correct is a good warm up. If not, you can’t solve the halting program either. What does that have to do with consciousness though? Having read “I Am a Strange Loop” I do not believe Hofstadter indicates that the existence of Gödel’s theorem precludes consciousness being realizable on a Turing machine. Rather if I recall correctly he points out that as a possible argument and then attempts to refute it. On the other hand Penrose is a prominent believer that human’s ability to understand Gödel’s theorem indicates consciousness can’t be realized on a Turing machine but there’s far from universal agreement on that point. | | |
| ▲ | Mehvix 3 days ago | parent [-] | | per halting problem: any system capable of self reference has unprovable (un)truths, the system can not be complete and consistent. consciousness falls under this umbrella I'll try and ask OG q more clearly: why would the brain, consciousness, be formalizable? I think there's a yearn view nature as adhering to an underlying model, and a contrary view that consciousness is transcendental, and I lean towards the latter |
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