Honestly, the author is spot on about the normalisation problem. I've watched this play out at multiple organisations. You implement TLS inspection, spend ages getting certs deployed, and within six months `curl -k` is in half your runbooks because "it's just the corporate proxy again".

He's also absolutely right about the architectural problems too, single points of failure, performance bottlenecks, and the complexity in cloud-native environments.

That said, it can be a genuinely valuable layer in your security arsenal when done properly. I've seen it catch real threats, such as malware C2 comms, credential phishing, data exfiltration attempts. These aren't theoretical; they happen daily. Combined with decent threat intelligence feeds and behavioural analytics, it does provide visibility that's hard to replicate elsewhere.

But, and this is a massive but, you can't half-arse it. If you're going to do TLS inspection, you need to actually commit:

Treat that internal CA like it's the crown jewels. HSMs, strict access controls, proper rotation schedules, full-chain and sensible life-span. The point about concentrated risk is bang on, you've turned thousands of distributed CA keys into one single target. So act like it. Run it like a proper CA with proper key signing ceremonies and all the safeguards etc.

Actually invest in proper cert distribution. Configuration management (Ansible/Salt/whatever), golden container base images with the CA bundle baked in, MDM for endpoints, cloud-init for VMs. If you can't reliably push a cert bundle to your entire estate, you've got bigger problems than TLS inspection.

Train people properly on what errors are expected vs "drop everything and call security". Document the exceptions. Make reporting easy. Actually investigate when someone raises a TLS error they don't recognise. For dev's, it needs to just work without them even thinking about it. Then they don't need to work around it, ever. If they need to, the system is busted.

Scope it ruthlessly. Not everything needs to go through the proxy. Developer workstations with proper EDR? Maybe exclude them. Production services with cert pinning? Route direct. Every blanket "intercept everything" policy I've seen has been a disaster. Particularly for end-users doing personal banking, medical stuff, therapy sessions, do you really want IT/Sec seeing that?

Use it alongside modern defences. ie EDR, Zero Trust, behavioural analytics, CASB. It should be one layer in defence-in-depth, not your entire security strategy.

Build observability, you need metrics on what's being inspected, what's bypassing, failure rates, performance impact. If you can't measure it, you can't manage it.

But Yeah, the core criticism stands though, even done well, it's a massive operational burden and it actively undermines trust in TLS. The failure modes are particularly insidious because you're training people to ignore the very warnings that are meant to protect them.

The real question isn't "TLS inspection: yes or no?" It's: "Do we have the organisational maturity, resources, and commitment to do this properly?" If you're not in a regulated industry or don't have dedicated security teams and mature infrastructure practices, just don't bother. But if you must do it, and plenty of organisations genuinely must, then do it properly or don't do it at all.

Hallelujah!

But I have to say, big regulated orgs are often not competent to do things this (the right) way but don't have the option of not doing it at all.