How does the Supreme Court’s elimination of Chevron deference affect USCIS’s ability to narrowly interpret the EB-1A regulatory framework, particularly at Step 1 of the Kazarian analysis? I am specifically interested in two areas: (1) whether, under a strict textual reading of the judging the work of others criterion in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3), participation in code review where the beneficiary evaluates and approves the technical work of others in the same field should qualify without USCIS applying extra regulatory limitations, and (2) whether USCIS can continue using its historically restrictive approach to comparable evidence under 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(4) now that courts are no longer required to defer to agency interpretations. I understand that even if these issues favor the petitioner at Step 1 they may not change the outcome of the final merits determination under Step 2, and I am trying to determine how a post Chevron, strictly textual approach might influence Step 1 outcomes for petitioners whose achievements do not align neatly with the ten listed criteria.