| ▲ | glitchc an hour ago | |||||||||||||
This logic does not follow. Your argument seems to be "the implementation has security bugs, so let's not ratify the standard." That's not how standards work though. Ensuring an implementation is secure is part of the certification process. As long as the scheme itself is shown to be provably secure, that is sufficient to ratify a standard. If anything, standardization encourages more investment, which means more eyeballs to identify and plug those holes. | ||||||||||||||
| ▲ | johncolanduoni an hour ago | parent | next [-] | |||||||||||||
No, the argument is that the algorithm (as specified in the standard) is difficult to implement correctly, so we should tweak it/find another one. This is a property of the algorithm being specified, not just an individual implementation, and we’ve seen it play out over and over again in cryptography. I’d actually like to see more (non-cryptographic) standards take this into account. Many web standards are so complicated and/or ill-specified that trillion dollar market cap companies have trouble implementing them correctly/consistently. Standards shouldn’t just be thrown over the wall and have any problems blamed on the implementations. | ||||||||||||||
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| ▲ | arccy an hour ago | parent | prev [-] | |||||||||||||
this is like saying just use C and don't write any memory bugs. possible, but life could be a lot better if it weren't so easy to do so. | ||||||||||||||
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