Key quote: "Pozsar’s argument: the moment Western nations froze Russian foreign exchange reserves, the assumed risk-free nature of these dollar holdings changed fundamentally. What had been viewed as having negligible credit risk suddenly carried confiscation risk. For any country potentially facing future sanctions, the calculus of holding large dollar reserve positions shifted."

My only critique here is that Russia is an outlier, along with China, because they both hold large dollar reserves and have a contentious relationship with the US. You have to go pretty far down the list to find another nation that is likely to face US sanctions - and those nations, like Libya and Iran, are already heavily sanctioned!

>and have a contentious relationship with the US

I sort of feel many countries that used to not have a contentious relationship with the US have one now and thus the observation of outlier status doesn't really work anymore.

Normally that would be a fair point (and maybe it was valid in 2022).

But given the US approach to foreign policy in 2025, one could argue that the list of countries that “have a contentious relationship with the US” (or, maybe more accurately, the other way around) is a lot longer and less clear-cut today than it was a few years ago.

the set of US adversaries is not presently shrinking, to put it mildly

Brazil and India and are actually already being targeted by the current administration