I think his point is that the link can be weaponized by others to deny service to his website, if they can get you to click on it elsewhere.

I see.

Moreover, there is no easy way to distinguish such a fetch from one generated by the bad actors that this is intended against.

When the bots follow the trampoline page's link to the honeypot, they will

- not necessarily fetch it soon afterward;

- not necessarily fetch it from the same IP address;

- not necessarily supply the trampoline page as the Referer.

Therefore you must assume that out-of-the-blue fetches of the honeypot page from a previously unseen IP address must be bad actors.

I've mostly given up on honeypotting and banning schemes on my webserver. A lot of attacks I see are single fetches of one page out of the blue from a random address that never appears again (making it pointless to ban them).

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