| ▲ | immibis 3 days ago |
| Nobody's saying the government shouldn't be able to go after the owner of the site and force them to shut it down. It definitely shouldn't be done by third parties though. |
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| ▲ | mike-cardwell 3 days ago | parent | next [-] |
| How does the US government, force a Russian website, hosted in Russia, for Russian people, following Russian laws, to shut down? |
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| ▲ | vintermann 3 days ago | parent | next [-] | | It shouldn't be able to, clearly. Not any more than Russia should be able to shut down a US website, hosted in the US, for US people, following US laws. | |
| ▲ | immibis 3 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Same thing they do to every country, Pinky. Have a small team invade the country and disappear the people they don't like[1]. Or tap the fiber lines at the border and inject RST packets from off-path, which is something the Great Firewall of China does, and is ironically much more transparent than what they actually are doing. Or cut the cables between the USA and Russia, or between the USA and any country that doesn't cut their own cables to Russia. The USA did this to Iran with the banking system and it worked: the USA cuts money transfers with any country that doesn't cut money transfers with Iran. I don't think it would necessarily go their way if they did it right now with the internet. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Omar_case | |
| ▲ | hereme888 3 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Dove a bit into this topic superficially out of curiosity. Maybe not shut it down but greatly limit reach: - Domain Name Seizures via ICANN and registrars - Political/legal pressure on CDNs, SSL certificate providers, bandwidth providers. - Propaganda and legal labeling ("malicious actor", "foreign agent", "terrorist") - There are technical workarounds to keep the page up within Russia's sovereign internet (Runet). | | |
| ▲ | MeetingsBrowser 3 days ago | parent [-] | | Other than labeling, aren't these just different ways to block foreign sites? Some of them are mentioned in the article. > This blocking regulation requires network providers, including CDNs, to comply with blocking notices within 30 minutes. > orders that go beyond regular Internet providers, requiring DNS resolvers and VPN services to take action as well. |
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| ▲ | malfist 3 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | It doesn't. | |
| ▲ | rjdj377dhabsn 3 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | They shouldn't. |
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| ▲ | skeledrew 3 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| And 3rd parrot parties with enough power, the ones doing the abuse, typically also have the ear of the government, so it becomes circular. |
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| ▲ | loeg 3 days ago | parent | prev [-] |
| The US already deputizes third parties to enforce its laws. Banks are responsible for KYC / AML. Grocery stores must check ID when selling alcohol. This is nothing special. |
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| ▲ | tastyfreeze 3 days ago | parent | next [-] | | I wouldn't call legal force to be deputizing anybody. If those entities don't do as the law says they will be in trouble themselves. Deputies have authority. Banks and stores are just following the rules and report to authority when required. | | | |
| ▲ | AnthonyMouse 3 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | It's accurate that the US already does it, but that doesn't tell you if we should be doing it. It does, however, provide evidence that doing that is dumb. KYC/AML have an effectiveness that rounds to zero while causing trouble for innocent people as the government pressures the banks to do something about problems the banks aren't in a position to actually solve, so instead the banks suspend the accounts of more innocent people because the government is pressuring them to suspend more accounts. | | |
| ▲ | loeg 3 days ago | parent [-] | | > KYC/AML have an effectiveness that rounds to zero That's factually inaccurate. | | |
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