> Requiring technical evidence such as screencasts showing reproducibility, integration or unit tests demonstrating the fault, or complete reproduction steps with logs and source code makes it much harder to submit slop.

If this isn't already a requirement, I'm not sure I understand what even non-AI-generated reports look like. Isn't the bare-minimum of CVE reporting a minimally reproducible example? Like, even if you find some function, that for example doesn't do bounds-checking on some array, you can trivially write some unit testing code that's able to break it.

As someone who worked on the recieving end of security reports, often not. They can be surprisingly poorly written.

You sort of want to reject them all, but ocassionally a gem gets submitted which makes you reluctant.

For example, years ago i was responsible for triaging bug bounty reports at a SaaS company i worked at at the time. One of the most interesting reports was that someone found a way to bypass our oauth thing by using a bug in safari that allowed them to bypass most oauth forms. The report was barely understandable written in broken english. The impression i got was they tried to send it to apple but apple ignored them. We ended up rewriting the report and submitting it to apple on there behalf (we made sure the reporter got all credit).

If we ignored poorly written reports we would have missed that. Is it worth it though? I dont know.

The problem that is that a lot of CVEs often don't represent "real" vulnerabilities, but merely theoretical ones that could hypothetically be combined to make a real exploit.

Regex exploitation is the forever example to bring up here, as it's generally the main reason that "autofail the CI system the moment an auditing command fails" doesn't work on certain codebases. The reason this happens is because it's trivial to make a string that can waste significant resources to try and do a regex match against, and the moment you have a function that accepts a user-supplied regex pattern, that's suddenly an exploit... which gets a CVE. A lot of projects then have CVEs filed against them because internal functions rely on Regex calls as arguments, even if they're in code the user is flat-out never going to be able interact with (ie. Several dozen layers deep in framework soup there's a regex call somewhere, in a way the user won't be able to access unless a developer several layers up starts breaking the framework they're using in really weird ways on purpose).

The CVE system is just completely broken and barely serves as an indicator of much of anything really. The approval system from what I can tell favors acceptance over rejection, since the people reviewing the initial CVE filing aren't the same people that actively investigate if the CVE is bogus or not and the incentive for the CVE system is literally to encourage companies to give a shit about software security (at the same time, this fact is also often exploited to create beg bounties). CVEs have been filed against software for what amounts to "a computer allows a user to do things on it" even before AI slop made everything worse; the system was questionable in quality 7 years ago at the very least, and is even worse these days.

The only indicator it really gives is that a real security exploit can feel more legitimate if it gets a CVE assigned to it.