> There appears to be an undercurrent of this sort underway where the soaring popularity of RISC-V in markets such as China is politically ripe for some incumbent ISAs to turn US government opinion against RISC-V, from a general uptake PoV or from the PoV of introducing laborious procedural delays in the uptake.

> Turning the ISA into an ISO standard helps curb such attempts.

Why do you think that would help? I fail to see how that would help.

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fork-bomber 17 hours ago | parent [-]

An ISO standard is hard to gepolitically regulate, I would think.

It also cements the fact that the technology being standardized is simply too fundamental and likely ubiquitous for folks to worry about it being turned into a strategic weapon.

Taking the previously mentioned ethernet example (not a perfect one I should accentuate again): why bother with blocking it's uptake when it is too fundamentally useful and enabling for a whole bunch of other innovation that builds on top.

	▲	Someone 5 hours ago \| parent [-]
		You can’t (easily) make a standard go away but being a standard doesn’t stop anyone from making it illegal to use. > It also cements the fact that the technology being standardized is simply too fundamental and likely ubiquitous Why do you think everything with an ISO standard is even remotely fundamental? There is an ISO standard for M/MUMPS (https://www.iso.org/standard/29268.html, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MUMPS, for example, but I wouldn’t call it fundamental. Some systems would break if MUMPS became illegal, but fundamental requires more, IMO.