To me, the article's thesis and frame of reference hinges on one statement: That the writer viewed Oct 7th as a "legible expression of rage." Those who see Hamas as non-representative of the Palestinian people, and certainly not working in their best interests, do not see Oct 7th as some sort of crime of passion or explosion of popular will, but as an actual attempt at genocide that was years in the planning.

But even if it was only an expression of popular rage, the author implies that such an expression would be justifiable. I'd submit that if his moral framework can justify that, then why is any other violent expression of rage unjustified? I don't personally believe that Israel's retaliation against Hamas is primarily for revenge or rage, although I'm sure those play a role. But surely that rage is legible to him as well, so on what grounds would the author criticize it?

It seems to me that by justifying murder by one side of the conflict, he leaves himself no moral authority to comdemn the other side. I suppose that implicit, but never really stated, is that the weaker side's rage is morally defensible while the stronger side's is not. But this is why he takes pains to describe Gaza before 10/7 as an "open-air prison" and to specifically negate the influence of Iran. In a larger scope, Israel is the weaker party in the Middle East, and if smallness justifies rage which justifies killing, then the logic of what is legible would certainly have to extend to Israel's response as well.