TLS exposes hostnames in plaintext via SNI. If using TLS version below 1.3 hostnames contained in the server certificate are in plaintext, too. ECH still "experimental", not in widespread use, no delivery deadline.

In theory encryption is something that protects the "common person", but SillyCon Valley's version of encryption, "TLS", is, unfortunately, mostly used for data exfiltration by third party intermediaries, so-called "tech" companies, i.e., opportunistic "business people".

Rather than protecting the "common person", the _primary_ use of "TLS" is to faciltate violation of the "common person's" privacy for profit, and to protect the third party intermediary's privacy intrusions from detection by the "common person", by making it difficult for the "common person" to monitor the outgoing traffic from their computers.

The privacy risk created by this third-party controlled encryption ("TLS") is why corporations must perform "TLS inspection". They have to decrypt TLS connections and then re-encrypt them in order to monitor the outgoing traffic from their networks. But the opportunistic "business people" in SillyCon Valley know the "common person" will not do TLS inspection.

But that's not all. Further third parties, more opportunistic "business people" called "certificate authorities" play a disproportionate role in brokering TLS connections, deciding on behalf of the "common person" who is trustworthy and who is not. This largely relies on "ICANN DNS", another laughable SillyCon Valley implementation, and is thus severely flawed, but that is another topic.

SillyCon Valley's so-called "tech" companies utilise this third party "CA system" to make it difficult for the "common person" to exercise control over deciding who they want to trust or distrust, e.g., by frustrating the use of so-called "self-signed certificates" by the "common person". Meanshile, the SillyCon Valley companies ensure that _by default_ the SillyCon Valley companies' certificates are trusted. In some cases, the certificates (or their digital fingerprints) are hardcoded into software used by the "common person".

Despite what the average "tech" worker would like the "common person" to believe, "TLS" is not synonymous with "encryption". Nor is criticism of TLS necessarily criticism of encryption. TLS is only a lame, user-hostile implementation of encryption that the "common person" must suffer while so-called "tech" companies use it to protect their surreptitious data collection from the "common person".