You're arguing as if the debate was about the UK formalizing its intentions to recognize a palestinian transition government that would recognize Israel. It isn't. Otherwise we would probably not have as strong a disagreement.

My disagreement is on the recognition itself at this moment in time, with Hamas still being the strongest military and political force in what could be a Palestinian state in the future.

The conditions are not met, but the recognition is already formalized. Is the plan to rescind the recognition if the PLO don't act or isn't in capacity to act on its promises?

I think it effectively rewards Hamas actions on October 7th even if it isn't the intended purpose.

And when I say that I think it will encourage terrorism, I don't mean only in Israel but in the world. That might well be a possible way out for Israel as you say, but I believe it will become the strongest success for a terrorist organization in a very long time and give ideas to other faction worldwide, especially among jihadists.

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lossolo 7 hours ago | parent [-]

They recognized a state, not Hamas.

All three governments paired recognition with language that explicitly excludes Hamas from any governing role and ties the path forward to PA reform, elections, and 1967 based parameters. Canada spelled out elections in 2026 with Hamas barred and a demilitarized Palestinian state, Australia said plainly "Hamas must have no role in Palestine" the UK framed recognition inside a two state horizon and negotiations, not as an endorsement of whoever currently wields guns in Gaza.

You can recognize a state while withholding recognition and cooperation from a particular authority. That’s what’s happening here: political recognition to salvage a two state outcome while keeping Hamas proscribed and sanctioned. The UK, Australia and Canada continue to list/designate Hamas as a terrorist organization and maintain sanctions, nothing about these decisions lifted that status.

> If conditions aren’t met, what leverage remains?

Plenty. Recognition can be followed by conditional steps (embassies, treaties, budget support, security cooperation) that only move if reforms happen so exactly what Canada, UK and Australia are signaling by tying recognition to PA reform, elections, demilitarization and negotiated borders. If those benchmarks stall, governments can freeze high level engagement, funding and agreements without "rescinding" recognition. The point is to separate Palestinian national rights from Hamas’s fortunes, not fuse them.

It’s an attempt to take the oxygen out of their narrative by decoupling Palestinian statehood from Hamas’s fate and putting the burden on reformed, elected, non Hamas institutions to represent Palestinians. If that path advances, Hamas loses relevance. And as I already mentioned, if it stalls, the recognition still strengthens the legal/political basis for a negotiated two state endgame instead of leaving the field to endless war and maximalists on both sides.

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guizmo 5 hours ago | parent [-]

It's very fortunate that they didn't change from being Israel allies to Hamas allies.

However, they recognized a state while the previous position was that they would not recognize one until an agreement is found with Israel.

The Hamas and the people that celebrated October 7th in the West will celebrate this as a victory and for a good reason because of the timing (in fact, they already did...).

You made the best case that I read so far on a recognition though from a diplomatic point of view. I just think it's wishful thinking given the force in presence in the palestinian society, and that it evacuate too casually the optics of a recognition before any condition is met, which will be seen as an unconditional recognition by many (most?) people.

What happens when Hamas or an a similar faction kill any reformist and take back control for example? Not exactly an implausible scenario given the relatively recent history.

	▲	lossolo 5 hours ago \| parent [-]
		I get the optics point but the policy substance is narrower than the headline and there are ways to keep it from becoming the "unconditional victory" you’re worried about. Recognition is not equal to a blank check. > The Hamas and the people that celebrated October 7th in the West will celebrate this as a victory and for a good reason because of the timing (in fact, they already did...). Some will. But policymaking can’t be held hostage to who posts what on Telegram. The question is whether the net effect shrinks Hamas’s political space so give non Hamas Palestinians a credible horizon and resources only if they meet benchmarks that Hamas refuses. That’s how you break the militants monopoly on results. > However, they recognized a state while the previous position was that they would not recognize one until an agreement is found with Israel. Because the last 30 years show waiting for perfect conditions just entrenches the status quo. Recognition now creates a legal/political anchor (Palestine exists in principle), while the capacity to exercise that sovereignty is earned. It flips the incentive so reformers can tell their own street, "we can actually deliver borders/freedom if we keep Hamas out and meet X, Y, Z..." > What happens when Hamas or an a similar faction kill any reformist and take back control for example? Then you haven’t "rewarded" terrorism, you’ve precommitted the world to a two state endgame while keeping teeth so you freeze benefits, tighten sanctions and preserve the political baseline for the day spoilers weaken. That’s still better than the current loop where only hardliners can claim momentum. So I’m not hand waving the risks. I’m arguing that recognition + hard conditionality + security guardrails gives you a strategy, not a hope. It separates Palestinian national rights from Hamas’s fate, creates leverage over the PA and builds a path where spoilers lose material advantages the moment they act like spoilers.