▲ | godelski 3 days ago | |||||||
Thanks, I haven't been able to give the paper a proper read, but are they're basing claims via results or the ability to recover physics equations? Because those two things are very different. You can have models that make accurate predictions without having accurate models of "the world" (your environment, not necessarily the actual world)[0]. We can't meaningful call something a physics model (or a world model) without that counterfactual recovery (you don't need the exact laws of physics but you need something reasonable). After all, our physics equations are the most compressed forms or representing the information we're after. I ask because this is a weird thing that happens in a lot of ML papers when approaching world models. But just looking at results isn't enough to conclude if a world is being modeled. Doesn't even tell you if that's self consistent, let alone counterfactual. [0] classic example is the geocentric model. They made accurate predictions, which is why it stayed around for so long. It's not like the heliocentric model didn't present new problems. There was reason for legitimate scientific debate at the time but that context is easily lost to history. | ||||||||
▲ | flwi 3 days ago | parent [-] | |||||||
Hey author here. Your argument is completely valid, we only model physics implicitly and thus have no prove that the model "actually knows the physics". Practically, this might not matter much: If the model can predict the evolution of the system to a certain accuracy, the user won't care about the underlying knowledge. And even for modern physics (quantum / GR), we know we miss something and yet, the models we have are incredibly useful. On a tangent, we cannot prove that LLMs actually know language, yet they can be incredibly useful. Of course, a true world model would be much nicer to have, I agree with that! | ||||||||
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