▲ | neuronflux 5 days ago | ||||||||||||||||
They probably sent it from gmail which would pass the SPF check (google.com and gmail.com have the same SPF). They wouldn't have it signed to pass DKIM, but google doesn't use strict alignment checking so to pass DMARC either SPF or DKIM are acceptable.
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▲ | LeonM 4 days ago | parent | next [-] | ||||||||||||||||
What you're saying makes little sense. Yes, SPF (the original design) is horribly broken and trivially bypassed. The most prominent design flaw is that the inbound SMTP service uses the SMTP (rfc5321) MailFrom address for SPF validation, which is not the same sender address shown to the recipient, they can only see the the message (rfc5321) 'From' header address. SPF originally didn't require the domains in the MailFrom and From addresses to match, so an attacker would simply use a domain they control in the MailFrom address, and the 'spoofed' domain in the From header. That was in 10 years ago though. DMARC fixed this by adding the alignment requirement, meaning that the domains in the MailFrom and From address must match. By default the alignment policy is 'relaxed', meaning that the MailFrom and From domains can differ in subdomain, as long as they share the same organizational domain. Setting the SPF alignment to strict (aspf=s) like you mention in your post requires the domains to match exactly, with no subdomain differences allowed. So, it doesn't matter that Google doesn't use strict SPF alignment in the DMARC policy, the fact that they have DMARC already adds the requirement to SPF validation that the domains must match. Yes, google.com and gmail.com use the same IP ranges in the respective SPF policies, but Gmail will never allow you to send email addresses from a domain that you do not own. This is why domain validation is required when you set up Gmail with a custom domain. The only scenario where your explanation would hold up, is if the attacker was able to gain control of the DNS of a subdomain of the google.com domain, and successfully validated it as a custom domain in Gmail, then send emails from that subdomain in rfc5321.MailFrom address and the google.com domain itself as the rfc5322.From domain. | |||||||||||||||||
▲ | BCM43 4 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | ||||||||||||||||
I'm pretty confident gmail's servers don't let you send with headers matching @google.com email addresses you don't control though. | |||||||||||||||||
▲ | Avamander 5 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | ||||||||||||||||
Can't practically require both SPF and DKIM with DMARC anyways. Doing so would also be dumb as it would break forwarding (even when DKIM would otherwise remain intact). Deprecating SPF would do everyone a favour though. Especially for reasons like these. | |||||||||||||||||
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▲ | teraflop 4 days ago | parent | prev [-] | ||||||||||||||||
So any message from Gmail is treated as legitimate for google.com, and yet Gmail can't do its own checks on outgoing mail to ensure that unauthorized people don't put legal@google.com in the From: header? Seriously? | |||||||||||||||||
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