The device should ideally have some kind of secret material derived per device, like a passphrase generated from an MCU serial number or provisioned into EEPROM and printed on a label on the device.

Some form of "enter the code on the device" or "scan the QR code on the device" could then mutually authenticate the app using proof-of-presence rather than hardcoded passwords. This can still be done completely offline with no "cloud" or other access, or "lock in"; the app just uses the device secret to authenticate with the device locally. Then the user can set a raw RTSP password if desired.

This way unprovisioned devices are not nearly as vulnerable to network-level attacks. I agree that this is Not Awful but it's also Not Good. Right now, if you buy this camera and plug it into a network and _forget_ to set it up, it's a sitting duck for the time window between network connection and setup.

I agree that would be nice, but it also doesn't sound all that practical for a small vendor.

I used to sell a home networking device,[0] and I wouldn't do what you're describing. If there were an issue where the labels calculate the wrong password or the manufacturer screws up which device gets which label, you don't find out until months later when they're in customer hands and they start complaining, and now you have to unwind your manufacturing and fulfillment pipeline to get back all the devices you've shipped.

All that to protect against what attack? One where there's malicious software on the user's network that changes the device password before the user can? In that case, the user would just not use the camera because they can't access the feed.

[0] https://mtlynch.io/i-sold-tinypilot/

> The device should ideally have some kind of secret material derived per device, like a passphrase generated from an MCU serial number or provisioned into EEPROM and printed on a label on the device.

It is better than simple secret like 12345678 but it can go wrong too, like in the case of UPC UBEE routers where the list of potential passwords can be narrowed down to like ~60 possibilities using a googled generator [1] whilst knowing only the SSID.

It did require firmware reverse engineering to figure out [2][3] but applies to most devices I've encountered. User should ideally always change the default password regardless.

[1] https://upcwifikeys.com/UPC1236567

[2] https://deadcode.me/blog/2016/07/01/UPC-UBEE-EVW3226-WPA2-Re...

[3] https://web.archive.org/web/20161127232750/http://haxx.in/up...

AT&T routers, for example, ship like this. There's a wifi network and a wifi password printed onto the device.

But that also means then that often anyone with physical access can easily get into the device. The complicated password provides an additional layer of illusion of security, because people then figure "it's not a default admin password, it should be good". The fundamental problem seems to be "many people are bad at passwords and onboarding flows", and so trying variations on shipping passwords seem to result in mostly the same problems.

Well it was "the cheapest cam in Amazon" according to the article so my expectations were that this would not be "ideal".

> The device should ideally have some kind of secret material derived per device

Thats the wrong way to do it, just require the user create a secret on first boot, and have factory reset functionality for when you forget it.

These may be illegal in some jurisdictions due to accessibility laws, and are a bad idea in general, for these reasons as well as unattended configuration scenarios.

If you buy the camera, plug it in, and forget to set it up, you just flat out can't use it right? I agree that proof of presence is way better but how many people are seriously going to be affected?