▲ | thayne 2 days ago | ||||||||||||||||
I don't think any browsers still support OCSP. The problem with OCSP stapling is that it either the client has to fall back to doing OCSP checking itself if the server doesn't staple the signature, which has its own problems[1], or enough servers need to support ocsp stapling that the client can just reject connections that don't include it. And unfortunately, there was never a significant uptake for servers, partly because there wasn't really any incentive to implement OCSP stapling. Maybe if there was a TLS 2.0 (or some other standard) that required OCSP stapling and had other benefits as well, it could work. [1]: the biggest problem with non-stapled OCSP is what to do if you don't get a response for the ocsp request. If you fail open, an attacker can intercept the request to prevent you from knowing the cert is revoked, but if you fail closed, then any issue with the connection to the ocsp server results in loss of service. And then there are also issues with additional latency to wait for the ocsp response, privacy leaks from the ocsp requests, etc. | |||||||||||||||||
▲ | Ayesh 2 days ago | parent [-] | ||||||||||||||||
If the certificate was issued with must-staple flag, then the server can refuse to connect if the handshake did not include an OCSP response. web servers can refresh OCSP responses in the background and cache valid responses to add some tolerance against temporarily downtimes in the OCSP server. | |||||||||||||||||
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