Sorry man, but I work since 2012 in professional security development in C/C++. Normally no one talks anymore about things like buffer overflows, use after free,... since years. Everyone uses tools to check for this, and in the end it's cheaper than using Rust. The attack vectors we talk about are logic errors and wrong usage of crypto. Things that can happen with Bash, C/C++, Rust and any other language and that you can't check automatically. Additionally to that, we talk about supply chain attacks, a thing that Rust with Cargo falls deep into.

But, based on a initiative of some Rust entusiast of one Team we tried it. Result after a half of a year was to not to use it. Learning a new language is difficult, Rust is for much people not fun to write and a newbie Rust programmer writes worse code than a senior C/C++ programmer, even if it's the same person.

Beside of people hyped by Rust, there is not much interest to replace C/C++. Currently I see no existential risk at all. On the other hand, Rust currently is overhyped, I would not bet that it's easy to find long time experienced Rust developers to maintain your code in a decade.

> Normally no one talks anymore about things like buffer overflows, use after free,... since years

Some of the biggest vulnerabilities of recent years (e.g. Heartbleed) were out-of-bounds access. The most common vulnerability sources are things that are impossible in Rust, but cannot be fully solved via C++ static checkers.