I can believe that 80% of Russian casualties are drones, however that's more of an artefact of a dire shortage of artillery on the Ukrainian side.

Drones are the one thing theyve got left. It makes sense theyd hype them up. It also makes sense that military-industrial complex lobbying machinery like your website would hype up whatever seems to be working - it fills their order book.

>The switch to drone warfare may be a problem of Russia.

Body bag exchange ratios have recently topped ~40:1. Actual casualty ratios are (being generous, here) probably 25:1 at this point.

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tim333 2 days ago | parent [-]

I suspect your casualty figures are from Russian misinformation rather than reality if you mean 25 Ukrainians for 1 Russian.

Reasonably neutral estimates have the military deaths since 2022 at about 80k Ukrainians, 250k Russians. (see wikipedia)

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pydry a day ago | parent [-]

BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckg752y13meo

That case was 1212:27, or 44:1.

>Reasonably neutral estimates have the military deaths since 2022 at about 80k Ukrainians, 250k Russians

You might want to reassess your measure of what constitutes "reasonably neutral" because that 80k number is off by roughly an order of magnitude.

It's also worth noting that these lopsided 44:1 casualty exchange ratios are A) a relatively recent phenomenon - only in the last ~4-5 months. They are hard to bullshit though.

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ponector a day ago | parent | next [-]

Body exchange means only that, not related to causality count. If russians are continuing slow advance, where do you expect bodies to be found? Who is controlling territories heavily covered with dead bodies?

Russian army is attacking with little to no success, and it's reasonable to expect 3:1 KIA rate between attacking and defending sides.

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pydry a day ago | parent [-]

>Body exchange means only that, not related to causality count

Thats the most off the wall opinion Ive heard today.

>If russians are continuing slow advance, where do you expect bodies to be found?

Note that body exchanges were not this lopsided when Russia was retreating in 2022.

>it's reasonable to expect 3:1 KIA rate between attacking and defending

Unless one side is comprehensively outgunned and keeps falling into cauldron traps because they have orders to cling on to land at all costs.

Which seems to be a repeated pattern here.

	▲	ponector a day ago \| parent [-]
		>> Note that body exchanges were not this lopsided when Russia was retreating That is the point. There are simply no Russian bodies in the territories controlled by Ukrainian army. To extract bodies they should be far from the front line, with current drone activity it's 20+ km. Body exchange says nothing about KIA. If russian "meat" assault costs them a 100 killed to fulfill talk to capture a treeline - those 100 bodies will be on russian-controlled territory and not for exchange.

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tim333 a day ago | parent | prev [-]

I'm not sure an exchange of bodies like that has much to do with casualty ratios.