> Why should I not be allowed to

Same as I said above: you are asking for a new feature. Their default is those 20 lines that "protect" the files. If they want to offer you a way to still enable it, someone has to do it. Someone has to work on the UX of it, maybe there is a need to explain to the users why it is less secure when this feature is enabled, and then there is work to do with the criticisms that will come next time someone shoots themselves in the foot because of this feature (because "Signal shouldn't have allowed that in the first place").

I know, you will say "it's not much". But everybody asks for their "small feature", and projects generally can't do everything that everybody asks them to do (and usually for free).

I find it totally valid if they choose that they won't offer features to lower their security, and instead they will work on features having sufficiently good security. Which in this case is the secure backup.

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Y-bar 6 days ago | parent [-]

> you are asking for a new feature

I think we have vastly different definitions of what is a "new" feature. This is not about adding a new feature, but removing an old bug.

> If they want to offer you a way to still enable it, someone has to do it.

They can just use the iOS system settings to allow users to enable/disable backups. This would be zero code needed. Zero maintainability problems. Zero UX. Zero unexpected data loss for customers. The settings for this is for all sane apps at Manage Storage > Backups > [Device Name] > [App Name].

> I know, you will say "it's not much". But everybody asks for their "small feature"

It's less than anything, it's removing a "feature", which should make things easier to maintain.

Signal _added_ the "feature" to disable the default iOS behaviour that user data can be backed up securely. This caused, in many users life, a bug of unexpected data loss. Signal caused that bug and that data loss by introducing this "feature".

Again, fixing this bug would not require a new feature to be added, but rather an unwanted bug to be removed by removing code needed to maintain it.

> I find it totally valid if they choose that they won't offer features to lower their security, and instead they will work on features having sufficiently good security. Which in this case is the secure backup.

Not a single argument has been given why this would be more secure than the locally encrypted backup you can do yourself in iOS. In fact, it would be sane to suggest that any newly introduced claimed secure system is insecure until tested.

Edit: It's also worth noting that their disable-backups feature is a bit hack:y (see https://blog.eidinger.info/prevent-your-apps-files-from-bein...)

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palata 5 days ago | parent [-]

I understand that you are frustrated. And I understand that if you were to write Signal, you would do it differently.

Still, those 20 lines don't look like a bug to me. And Signal does not benefit from pissing you off. I was just trying to say that maybe, just maybe, there is a valid reason behind this.

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Y-bar 5 days ago | parent [-]

The bug is not in the detailed implementation of the code logic per se, the bug is that it causes unexpected data loss because iOS users expect all their data to be backed up when they back up all their important data.

As an example, a piece of code sending authentication credentials in plain text across the internet might in isolation be considered free of bugs. But it should never do that to begin with, it should have been designed/architected quite a bit differently.

You are free to carry water for Signal while they repeatedly refuse to even explain why they consider this a valid approach to handle the users data.

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palata 5 days ago | parent [-]

"I consider it a bug because I really want this feature" does not change the fact that it is a feature.

> As an example, a piece of code sending authentication credentials in plain text across the internet might in isolation be considered free of bugs.

This is not a good example. It's almost certainly a security issue. Unless you have a threat model where you absolutely don't give a shit about it, but we're not in 2010 anymore. Let me try to make another one:

As an example, a messenging app sending encrypted but not end-to-end encrypted messages over a server may be considered free of bugs. Adding end-to-end encryption to it would be a new feature, and it may well be out of scope for that particular app (ever heard of Telegram?).

Because you really want it doesn't make it a bug.

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Y-bar 5 days ago | parent [-]

Today I learned that some people consider unexpected data loss a feature, and that removing such a "feature" is in fact the same as adding a new feature.

It's newspeak all in the software world. A first for everything I suppose.

	▲	palata 4 days ago \| parent [-]
		> Today I learned that some people consider unexpected data loss a feature I did not say that, and I am not sure if you genuinely do not understand or if you do it on purpose. Let me try one last time with simple constructs: The lack of backup is not a feature. The lack of backup is a missing feature. The lack of backup is not a bug. > and that removing such a "feature" is in fact the same as adding a new feature. I have no clue what you are trying to say here, it's just gibberish.