That particular phrasing happened to catch on, but I don't think it's essential to any of the arguments. How would you phrase the distinction between objects that are conscious and objects that aren't? Or are you saying that that distinction is just a verbal trick?

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bondarchuk 5 days ago | parent [-]

>How would you phrase the distinction between objects that are conscious and objects that aren't?

You just did! Why would we need to rephrase this and then attach special importance to that new sentence construction, when "the distinction between objects that are conscious and objects that aren't" is perfectly adequate?

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sethev 5 days ago | parent [-]

That's just a label, though, it makes no attempt to describe the difference. You could say a conscious object has subjective experience, but that's open to the same observation that it implies there are two things (the subject and the experience).

	▲	bondarchuk 4 days ago \| parent [-]
		I can only use a label to vaguely point at the concept of consciousness, and thus the disctinction between conscious and non-conscious objects. This is not infinitely precise, because noone really understands what's going on. What you call "describing the difference" would in fact be making further claims about consciousness. If one is not in the position of making further claims, it is better to not make any claims and stick to vague but commonly understood labels, instead of making claims implicitly by using complicated labels without further examination.