It’s entirely possible. Claude’s security model for subagents/tasks is incoherent and buggy, far below the standard they set elsewhere in their product, and planning mode can use subagent/tasks for research.

Permission limitations on the root agent have, in many cases, not been propagated to child agents, and they’ve been able to execute different commands. The documentation is incomplete and unclear, and even to the extent that it is clear it has a different syntax with different limitations than are used to configure permissions for the root agent. When you ask Claude itself to generate agent configurations, as is recommended, it will generate permissions that do not exist anywhere in the documentation and may or may not be valid, but there’s no error admitted if an invalid permission is set. If you ask it to explain, it gets confused by their own documentation and tells you it doesn’t know why it did that. I’m not sure if it’s hallucinating or if the agent-generating-agent has access to internal detail details that are not documented anywhere in which the normal agent can’t see.

Anthropic is pretty consistently the best in this space in terms of security and product quality. They seem to actually care about doing software engineering properly. (I’ve personally discovered security bugs in several competing products that are more severe and exploitable than what I’m talking about here.) I have a ton of respect for Anthropic. Unfortunately, when it comes to sub agents in Claude code, they are not living up to standard they have set.