IMO OAuth2 is very poorly designed. It has several structural issues: "Connect this OAuth provider" hijack your main account, redirect hijack allows to leak either auth codes through Referrer or access_token through #hash passing, "state" CSRF token is optional and usually ignored etc

I have an old writeup on that and solution to it https://sakurity.com/oauth - better analyze it with LLM if interested in authorization protocols

▲

ted_dunning 7 days ago | parent [-]

Your comments are so highly abbreviated as to be nearly impossible to understand. I suspect that unintelligibility is leading to it being heavily downvoted.

The addition of the comment about LLMs isn't really helping.

	▲	derangedHorse 6 days ago \| parent \| next [-]
		His comments are also outdated. Browser binding with a separate nonce is standard practice by big identity providers, redirect uris are typically strictly validated, implicit flow without pkce is being phased out, and most browsers protect against a lot of would-be csrf attacks with strict samesite cookie headers.
	▲	homakov 7 days ago \| parent \| prev [-]
		I wasn’t criticizing the guide — just pointing out real OAuth2 pitfalls that still affect users. The spec itself made mistakes: • Silent account hijack via “Connect this provider.” • Redirect leaks of code (via Referrer) or access_token (via #hash). • CSRF because state was optional and often ignored. The point is: these aren’t obscure edge cases, they’re structural issues baked into the protocol.