In practice, DNSSEC won't do anything for ordinary Internet users, because it runs between recursive resolvers and authority servers, and ordinary users run neither: they use stub resolvers (essentially, "gethostbyname") --- which is why you DHCP-configure a DNS server when you connect to a network. If you were running a recursive resolver, your DNS server would just be "127.0.0.1".

The parent comment is also correct that the best DNSSEC can do for you, in the case where you're not relying on an upstream DNS server for resolution (in which case your ISP can invisibly defeat DNSSEC) is to tell you that a name has been censored.

And, of course, only a tiny fraction of zones on the Internet are signed, and most of them are irrelevant; the signature rate in the Tranco Top 1000 (which includes most popular names in European areas where DNSSEC is enabled by default and security-theatrically keyed by registrars) is below 10%.

DNS-over-HTTPS, on the other hand, does decisively solve this problem --- it allows you to delegate requests to an off-network resolver your ISP doesn't control, and, unlike with DNSSEC, the channel between you and that resolver is end-to-end secure. It also doesn't require anybody to sign their zone, and has never blown up and taken a huge popular site off the Internet for hours at a time, like DNSSEC has.

Whatever else DNSSEC is, it isn't really a solution for the censorship problem.

Obviously you need to enable local verification for DNSSEC to do anything in the first place, otherwise the DNS server can just lie about the DNSSEC status. If someone is manually configuring a DoH resolver, they probably have a toggle to do DNSSEC validation nearby.

DNSSEC doesn't prevent censorship, but it does make tampering obvious. Moving the point of trust from my ISP to Cloudflare doesn't solve any problems, Cloudflare still has to comply with national law. DoH is what you use to bypass censorship; DNSSEC is what you use to trust these random DNS servers you find on lists on Github somewhere.

A bit over half the websites I visit use signed zones. All banking and government websites I interact with use it. Foreign websites (especially American ones) don't, but because of the ongoing geopolitical bullshit, American websites are tough to trust even when nobody is meddling with my connection, so I'm not losing much there. That's n=1 and Americans will definitely not benefit because of poor adoption, but that only proves how much different kinds of "normal internet user" there are.