Something that helped me grok Compatibilism (I think…) is that there’s actually two layered ideas. The first layer is practical: there is a sense of freedom that is based on your actions and apparent choices being determined by your internal state and not just the state of the outside world. Similarly, that allows for a practical definition of responsibility. The second layer is metaphysical: because of the first layer these choices/actions have “meaning” and justify moral praise and blame. I agree with the first layer and not the second.

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gowld 3 days ago | parent [-]

Compatibilism is the belief we are only characters in a story, but at least we can enjoy the show. Put another way, we should pretend to have free will, because if we are pre-determined, we don't have a choice anyway.

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jebarker 3 days ago | parent [-]

Honestly, I don’t find that explanation helpful or accurate. I don’t think Compatibilism says we need to pretend we have free will. It says we do have free will, just not the metaphysical kind that most people want.

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root_axis 3 days ago | parent [-]

I'd add that generally, compatibalists don't believe that libertarian free will is the kind that most people want.

Most people believe in free will, most people also believe that their actions follow from prior causes, and most people also believe in moral desert, so most people are definitionally compatibalists.

The typical framing where people are asked to go back in time and imagine redoing past events without memory of the future pumps their intuition for time travel fiction where doing things differently is the entire point of the scenario. If you ask people "if everything happened exactly as it happened, could you alter the past to change the future?" most people would say no.

	▲	jebarker 3 days ago \| parent [-]
		Great point - I shouldn’t have suggested what most people want, that’s always dangerous