I've read about half the book. I stopped because I got the impression it'd run out of steam.

With that caveat, I do recommend it. In particular your comment indicates you would like it, if you're willing to accept the terminologies the author spends right away defining. He's very explicit that he's not trying to map to the colloquial definition of empathy. Which is the correct approach, because people's definitions vary wildly and it's important to separate from the value-loaded components to come to a fresh perspective.

The author makes a strong case that empathy, of the kind he defines, is often harmful to the person having empathy, as well as the persons receiving empathy.

> He's very explicit that he's not trying to map to the colloquial definition of empathy. Which is the correct approach, because people's definitions vary wildly and it's important to separate from the value-loaded components to come to a fresh perspective.

I read the prologue/introduction and Bloom says the inflammatory/proactive claims first then clarifies with his modified definition. That is going to hooks some people and throw some people off. So not above saying something misleading to hook some people more strongly, not an uncommon writing tactic but so often used and misused that it is off-putting to me.

> With that caveat, I do recommend it. In particular your comment indicates you would like it, if you're willing to accept the terminologies the author spends right away defining.

The wikipedia article seems to well match the intro of the book. Bloom in the intro does the same artificial separation I talked about above at least in implication.

> The notion of empathy that I’m most interested in is the act of feeling what you believe other people feel—experiencing what they experience. This is how most psychologists and philosophers use the term. But I should stress that nothing rests on the word itself. If you’d like to use it in a broader way, to refer to our capacity for caring and love and goodness, or in a narrower way, to refer to the capacity to understand others, well, that’s fine. For you, I’m not against empathy.

This statement only makes sense when "the act of feeling what you believe other people feel..." is separate/independent from "the capacity to understand others". There is no explicit claim that "the act of feeling what you believe other people feel..." does not enable or a part of "the capacity to understand others" only implicit.

That claim is a large one though and without evidence. I would not except these are independent cognitive functions and Blooms arguments seem to depend on them being mostly independent.

If we assume they are not mostly independent cognitive functions, against Bloom's implicit claim, then discouraging "the act of feeling what you believe other people feel..." will also discourage "the capacity to understand others". It is easy to come up with arm chair reasons for why these would be linked and enhancing each other to some reasonable extent.

From the writing in the intro I would assume Bloom does not dig on this issue to his premise and worry I would mostly collect more premises with unaddressed flaws if I continued to read the book. If you think there something in particular that is interesting to dig down on let me know.

After the intro, and skimming chapter 1, I have the same impression that I have to similar speculative works, that getting to the bottom of questions like these likely requires original and rigorous neurological or physiological research.