▲ | throw0101a 5 days ago | |
> It costs: Not wrong, but given these algorithms are mostly used at setup, how much cost is actually being occurred compared to the entire session? Certainly if your sessions are short-lived then the 'overhead' of PQC/hybrid is higher, but I'd be curious to know the actually byte and energy costs over and above non-PQC/hybrid, i.e., how many bytes/joules for a non-PQC exchange and how many more by adding PQC. E.g. > Unfortunately, many of the proposed post-quantum cryptographic primitives have significant drawbacks compared to existing mechanisms, in particular producing outputs that are much larger. For signatures, a state of the art classical signature scheme is Ed25519, which produces 64-byte signatures and 32-byte public keys, while for widely-used RSA-2048 the values are around 256 bytes for both. Compare this to the lowest security strength ML-DSA post-quantum signature scheme, which has signatures of 2,420 bytes (i.e., over 2kB!) and public keys that are also over a kB in size (1,312 bytes). For encryption, the equivalent would be comparing X25519 as a KEM (32-byte public keys and ciphertexts) with ML-KEM-512 (800-byte PK, 768-byte ciphertext). * https://neilmadden.blog/2025/06/20/are-we-overthinking-post-... "The impact of data-heavy, post-quantum TLS 1.3 on the Time-To-Last-Byte of real-world connections" (PDF): * https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Events/2024/fifth-pqc-stand... (And development time is also generally one-time.) | ||
▲ | thayne 5 days ago | parent [-] | |
For an individual session, the cost is certainly small. But in aggregate it adds up. I don't think the cost is large, and I agree that given the tradeoff, the cost is probably worth it, but there is a cost, and I'm not sure it can be categorized as "almost nothing". |