▲ | mcv 3 days ago | |||||||||||||||||||
Yeah, at some point the article says: > I’d done everything right. Vault encryption keys stored separately from my main infrastructure. Defense in depth. Zero trust architecture. The works. Did you? Is putting all your eggs in one basket "defense in depth"? Is total trust in AWS "zero trust architecture"? I'm not defending AWS here; they fully deserve all the fallout they can get from this, and I do feel for the dev who lost all their stuff through AWS's fuckup. Lots of people do the same. My current employer does the same. It's a major bank, and all of their stuff is Microsoft. Azure, SharePoint, Office, Teams, the works. I think it's foolish to trust a single foreign company with all your vital data and infrastructure, operating in q country where the government demands access to everything, but this is what everybody does now. We trust "the cloud" way too much, and expose ourselves to these sort of fuckups. | ||||||||||||||||||||
▲ | seuros 3 days ago | parent [-] | |||||||||||||||||||
I dont disagree with your broader point—centralizing everything in one provider is a systemic risk. The architecture was built assuming infrastructure within AWS might fail. What I didn’t plan for was the provider itself turning hostile, skipping their own retention policy, and treating verification as a deletion trigger. | ||||||||||||||||||||
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