▲ | OutOfHere 4 days ago | ||||||||||||||||
1. A regular hash algorithm is already very safe against quantum computing if the hash is sufficiently long, which it easily is or can be for passwords. A special hashing algorithm isn't needed for quantum safety. At worst the hash length has to be doubled for ultimate quantum safety. The assertion of needing a special hashing algorithm is bogus. 2. It is risked in practice. 3. It too is risked in practice. | |||||||||||||||||
▲ | jpc0 4 days ago | parent [-] | ||||||||||||||||
Seeing as we won’t agree on 2 and 3, let’s discuss 1. Your argument hinges on us getting access to a quantum computer that is stable enough for Shor’s algorithm to run invalidating RSA and ECC, current password hashes being updated using algorithms that are secure, or long enough, and a quantum safe algorithm not existing for PKi. Do you understand how this sequence of events is extremely unlikely, specifically since we already have quantum safe Public Key Algorithms and there is still ongoing research whereas it isn’t even known whether we will get a stable Quantum computer with enough qubits ever. | |||||||||||||||||
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