▲ | shenbomo 2 days ago | |||||||
Why DKIM signature doesn't include the content of the email too? | ||||||||
▲ | seszett 2 days ago | parent | next [-] | |||||||
It does. It's not obvious from the writing but Google actually sent this email to the attacker (which then redirected it mostly unchanged except for the To: header). The main content of the email is text used for the "App Name" field of the attacker's OAuth app. This explains why the screenshot of the email actually does look weird, with unlinked URLs and weird formatting. I'm pretty sure there is a lot more at the end of the email that makes it obvious it's not legitimate. But then I also understand how quite a few people wouldn't even get to the end. | ||||||||
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▲ | asimpletune 2 days ago | parent | prev [-] | |||||||
I don’t think the content was modified. If it had been then the signature would have been invalidated. The attacker found a way to send themself an email from Google that the author later replicated using Google workspace + a Google OAuth app. Then they replayed that because Google isn’t signing the “to” field. | ||||||||
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