https://security.apple.com/blog/private-cloud-compute/
> the system doesn’t even include a general-purpose logging mechanism. Instead, only pre-specified, structured, and audited logs and metrics can leave the node, and multiple independent layers of review help prevent user data from accidentally being exposed through these mechanisms
> We consider allowing security researchers to verify the end-to-end security and privacy guarantees of Private Cloud Compute to be a critical requirement for ongoing public trust in the system
> Private Cloud Compute hardware security starts at manufacturing, where we inventory and perform high-resolution imaging of the components of the PCC node before each server is sealed and its tamper switch is activated. When they arrive in the data center, we perform extensive revalidation before the servers are allowed to be provisioned for PCC. The process involves multiple Apple teams that cross-check data from independent sources, and the process is further monitored by a third-party observer not affiliated with Apple. At the end, a certificate is issued for keys rooted in the Secure Enclave UID for each PCC node. The user’s device will not send data to any PCC nodes if it cannot validate their certificates.
> Every production Private Cloud Compute software image will be published for independent binary inspection — including the OS, applications, and all relevant executables, which researchers can verify against the measurements in the transparency log. Software will be published within 90 days of inclusion in the log, or after relevant software updates are available, whichever is sooner. Once a release has been signed into the log, it cannot be removed without detection
> Additionally, PCC requests go through an OHTTP relay — operated by a third party — which hides the device’s source IP address before the request ever reaches the PCC infrastructure
I'm not saying it's an infallible system. Just relaying what Apple themselves announced.
