OpenPGP is a message format standard, not an architecture standard. Since they are doing a instant messaging thing, there is no particular reason they couldn't do forward secrecy. They could even do a hash ratchet and call the result a double ratchet if they really wanted to. It would probably be more reasonable to do something a bit less obsessive and just make it so that the user can more securely delete their messages in the face of device compromise in an instant messaging environment.

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woodruffw 17 hours ago | parent [-]

"Architecturally" refers to the architecture of OpenPGP's message and certificate formats, not some kind of architectural standard. You can see Delta Chat's own community struggle with this[1]: unbounded certificate growth doesn't mesh well with acceptable rotation periods for ephemeral keys. There's also the problem of OpenPGP implementations encrypting to all subkeys instead of the "latest" one, which of course blows a hole in the FS property.

[1]: https://support.delta.chat/t/autocrypt-key-rotation/2936

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upofadown 7 hours ago | parent [-]

The Delta Chat issue with subkeys seems to be an Autocrypt thing. Most OpenPGP implementations will encrypt with the latest encryption key.

Which brings up a point I suppose. Delta Chat is not really doing OpenPGP. They are mostly doing Autocrypt. Autocrypt was an attempt to do encrypted email without the bother of identity verification. It has always seemed like a bad idea to me. The Delta Chat project ended up adding identity verification on top of Autocrypt.

	▲	woodruffw 6 hours ago \| parent [-]
		They don’t seem to think it’s an Autocrypt thing; they seem to think it’s an issue with certificates being de facto append-only. Also, “most” is not acceptable —- if even a small percentage of Signal clients had this kind of FS-breaking bug it’d be considered a significant vulnerability. We should demand better than “most.”