I agree, but I think three extra conditions would need to be added here.

1. Devices should be allowed to display a different logo at boot time depending on whether the software is manufacturer-approved or not. That way, if somebody sells you an used device with a flashed firmware that steals all your financial data, you have a way to know.

2. Going from approved to unapproved firmware should result in a full device wipe, Chromebook style. Possibly with a three-day cooldown. Those aren't too much of an obstacle for a true tinkerer who knows what they're doing, but they make it harder to social engineer people into installing a firmware of the attackers' choosing.

3. Users should have the ability to opt themselves into cryptographic protection, either on the original or modified firmware, for anti-theft reasons. Otherwise, devices become extremely attractive to steal.

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xg15 a day ago | parent | next [-]

> Devices should be allowed to display a different logo at boot time depending on whether the software is manufacturer-approved or not.

Not sure how to phase this legally, but please also add a provision against manufacturers making the "custom firmware" logo hideously ugly on purpose to discourage rooting - like e.g.Microsoft did for Surface tablets.

> 3. Users should have the ability to opt themselves into cryptographic protection, either on the original or modified firmware, for anti-theft reasons.

Full agreement here. I very much would like to keep the bootloader locked - just to my own keys, not the OEMs.

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harvey9 a day ago | parent [-]

Someone with the motivation to install custom firmware would consider the bootsplash aesthetic a deal breaker?

	▲	AshamedCaptain a day ago \| parent \| next [-]
		Yes -- bootsplash showing "DANGER! YOUR SECURITY AT RISK! HACKERS CAN NOW STEAL YOUR GIRLFRIEND AND SHUFFLE YOUR PAIRS OF SOCKS!" in big bold red letters only because you enabled root to remove manufacturer malware (which if anything likely _increases_ your security) is a deal breaker, because it will frighten most users from doing it .
	▲	xg15 a day ago \| parent \| prev [-]
		If you want to promote alternative bootloaders or OSes for wider, nontechnical audiences (like LineageOS etc), then absolutely. I think it's a difference in mindset whether you view custom firmware as a grudging exception for techies (with the understanding that "normal" people should have a device under full control of their respective vendor), or whether you want an open OS ecosystem for everyone.

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xg15 a day ago | parent | prev | next [-]

> Devices should be allowed to display a different logo at boot time depending on whether the software is manufacturer-approved or not.

Another thought on that point: Why of all things is manufacturer approval so important? We know manufacturers often don't work for - or even work against - the interests of their end users. Manufacturer approval is not an indicator for security - as evidenced by the OP article.

If anything, we need independent third parties that can vet manufacturer and third party software and can attach their own cryptographic signatures as approval.

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gmueckl a day ago | parent | prev [-]

4. Apps with special security needs are allowed to detect whether a device is unlocked and can either disable themselves or go into a mode that shifts ALL related liability onto the user. It's not the bank's fault if the user disabled protections and some spyware logs the online banking password or something like that.

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Zak a day ago | parent | next [-]

I'm pretty sure I'm against this. I could be convinced otherwise by documentation of significant fraud involving compromised devices (especially Android phones) that would have been stopped by a device attestation scheme.

I should note Google has such an attestation scheme, and there are reliable defeats for it in most situations given root access. Apps have been able to insist on hardware-backed attestation which has not been defeated for some time, but that isn't available for old devices. Almost none do so.

If this had a meaningful impact on fraud, more apps would insist on the hardware-backed option, but that's quite rare. Even Google doesn't; I used Google Pay contactless with LineageOS and root this week. I'm currently convinced it's primarily a corporate power grab; non-Google-approved Android won't be a consumer success if it doesn't run your banking app, and the copyright lobby loves anything that helps DRM.

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ulrikrasmussen a day ago | parent [-]

Also, online banking has been a thing for so long on PCs which never had that kind of remote attestation. I also do not believe the security argument, but I believe that the banks believe it.

	▲	Zak a day ago \| parent \| next [-]
		I suspect the banks want to do checkbox-based compliance with regulators and insurers without any deep understanding of the underlying issues.
	▲	gmueckl a day ago \| parent \| prev [-]
		Online banking doesn't need remote attestation. Some additional locked down hardware with its own minimal display is enough. My banks force me to use devices like those made by Kobil or ReinerSCT.

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ulrikrasmussen a day ago | parent | prev | next [-]

My bank app refuses to work on LineageOS, but I can use the web interface just fine which has the exact same UI and functionality as the app. In both the native app and the web app I have to authorize any transactions using my national ID, which for me is a hardware token (the app for my national ID also refuses to run). Why is it somehow insecure to initiate this flow from a native app on LineageOS while it is not insecure to do the exact same via a browser on LineageOS? If the app can be compromised, so can the browser - the bank cannot trust all its browser based clients anyway.

The web app has been running with this security model for decades on PCs, and it has been fine. The whole narrative about remote attestation being necessary to protect users is an evil lie in my opinion, but it is an effective lie which has convinced even knowledgeable IT professionals that taking away device ownership from users is somehow justified.

	▲	gmueckl a day ago \| parent [-]
		A hardware device that doesn't confirm transaction details on its own locked down display enables man in the middle attacks. I have to use such devices with my bank card when banking online.

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mmh0000 a day ago | parent | prev | next [-]

It is the banks fault if they allow non-reversible, weird or large transactions without a secondary authorization capability.

The bank’s bad processes are not an end device fault.

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xg15 a day ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Yeah, nope. All apps have "special security needs" according to their manufacturers. Every app that relies on spying for revenue will use that to disable itself. (Or worse, actively malfunction - e.g. that banking app could switch into a special mode where it does transactions on its own that are not in the interest of the user. If the user has accepted all liability, there isn't much they could do against that)

I'm alright with limiting liability for an unlocked/customized phone (for things that happen from that phone) - but that's a legal/contractual thing. For that to work, it's enough for a judge to understand that the phone was customized at that time - it doesn't require the app to know.

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Dylan16807 a day ago | parent | prev [-]

Screw that. I want nearly the opposite. I don't really own my device if apps will look at my ownership flag and refuse to run.

We can talk about the consequences of spyware but definitely not a total liability shift. Also preventing root doesn't prevent spyware.