> When was the last time you had to bypass a cert warning because of "CA store wars" (whatever that means)?
Essentially all the time for the last 10 years...
Did you ever try to deploy a website with a certificate from a non public CA? Like, say, your company CA?
If you want it to be valid for Java users, you will have to store your CA cert on the Java trust store.
Want it available for users of Firefox ? Store it in the OS certificate store.
Want it available for Chrome users? Store it in the Chrome certificate store.
Want it available for Python users? Add it to certifi.
And so on.
No single piece of software validating certificates agree on a single CA certificate store.
So, essentially, no company out there supports all these stores, and you just train users to bypass these warnings.
> What examples can you give for public CAs giving certs to "whatever"?
There have been dozens of CAs removed from widespread trust stores for failing to do proper diligence or reporting leaked keys.
Not only that, but essentially I never myself to do any kind of diligence for whatever certificate I requested from public CAs beyond proving I had TXT records update powers at some point in time.
I'm not even mentioning fortune 500 websites running with expired certs.