This is a bad faith argument. Whatever measures Google takes to prevent this (certificate logs and key pinning) could just as well be utilized if registrars delegated cryptographic trust as they delegate domains.

It is also true that these contemporary prevention methods only help the largest companies which can afford to do things like distributing key material with end user software. It does not help you and me (unless you have outsourced your security to Google already, in which case there is the obvious second hand benefit). Registrars could absolutely help a much wider use of these preventions.

There is no technical reason we don't have this, but this is one area where the interest of largest companies with huge influence over standards and security companies with important agencies as customers all align, so the status quo is very slow to change. If you squint you can see traces of this discussion all the way from IPng to TLS extensions, but right now there is no momentum for change.

It's easy to tell stories about shadowy corporate actors retarding security on the Internet, but the truth is just that a lot of the ideas people have about doing security at global Internet scale just don't pan out. You can look across this thread to see all the "common sense" stuff people think should replace the WebPKI, most of which we know won't work.

Unfortunately, when you're working at global scale, you generally need to be well-capitalized, so it's big companies that get all the experience with what does and doesn't work. And then it's opinionated message board nerds like us that provide the narratives.