▲ | mindslight 17 hours ago | |||||||
Fantastic, another nothingburger proof of concept for people to point to when arguing in favor of more manufacturer-lockdown-based "security". It's not a coincidence that this demonstration is on one of the last generations of laptops that can actually be secured against Intel themselves. In reality, remote code execution should be considered game over, end of story. Trying to obfuscate to hide that fact just ends up creating more unknown places for malware to persistently hide. The same knowledge that allows one to write new camera firmware also allows one to verify it on every boot. Meanwhile the camera model that hasn't been publicly documented is an ever-present black box. | ||||||||
▲ | perching_aix 17 hours ago | parent [-] | |||||||
> for people to point to when arguing in favor of more manufacturer-lockdown-based "security" I don't see why this is the first thing you think of, when the infinitely more obvious thing to point out is that the indicator LED should be impossible to address and be connected in series with the power pin of the camera instead. Case in point, most other comments in this very discussion thread. Conversely, your comment (to me) reads like you're trying to derail conversation and argue in favor of weakening device security in whatever flavor you find compelling. Very intellectually honest of you to present those ideas this way. | ||||||||
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