My conclusion is that being on the corporate Wi-Fi should not give you access to anything. There should not have been any advantage to getting on the Wi-Fi, it should be treated like the public internet.

A separate VPN, with MFA, should be required to access anything.

My current org restricts wifi by user and by device in Active Directory. Thus you need to be whitelisted twice to get access.

We use 2fa pretty much everywhere, but I don't think we use it there. But it certainly wouldn't hurt as yet another layer.

Wifi adapters should be disabled via Group Policy for wired devices anyway.

When WiFi security was really bad I worked at a company that didn't use it at all. You connected to the WiFi without any authentication and then had to connect to a VPN server that used 2FA auth.

Corporate WiFi based on a password and a device certificate is fine. For BYO devices, you have a separate WiFi network that does require a VPN to reach the corporate network.

Also a VPN is just another perimeter. You wouldn't want a single device like a printer getting successfully attacked leading to everything in your network getting compromised. The real solution is to use a zero trust architecture

it should be a factor (defense in depth) but not the ONLY factor.