▲ | thomastjeffery 8 months ago | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
> I trust my doctor and my doctor trusts their sibling, but I don't necessarily trust their sibling. Sure, but let's get back to the use case we are exploring here: Do you trust your doctor's contact info for their sibling? Could it provide you utility? What about your doctor's contact info for the front desk of their practice? What's important here is that the subject of trust is explicit to whoever attests that trust. If your doctor intentionally publishes a list of known contacts, then it can be reasonably presumed that they know those contacts. This, along with the ability to attest falsehood, should be enough to replace traditional authority and moderation. I get into this more in my comment here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=42238201 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
▲ | woodruffw 8 months ago | parent [-] | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
> Sure, but let's get back to the use case we are exploring here: Do you trust your doctor's contact info for their sibling? Could it provide you utility? What about your doctor's contact info for the front desk of their practice? Not inherently: for all I know, my doctor is technically illiterate and their contact book is thoroughly padded with spam. The problem of trust is that trust isn't a boolean; it's a set of policies that vary by principal and action. It's very hard to encode that in a truly general way, which is why modern cryptographic application design orthodoxy dictates that applications should try to solve exactly one kind of trust at a time. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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