I'm not sure it's possible to be uncensorable in principle. If you can't make QoS decisions, you can't distinguish jamming from normal activity. Jamming then becomes the means of censorship. If you monitor your target's transmissions, you can jam only when they're transmitting, allowing targeted censorship. (The technical difficulty involved may be sufficient to be uncensorable in practice. Your threat model may vary. My issue is with whether this is possible in principle.)

It's sort of like the how the paradox of tolerance limits how much freedom of speech is possible, in that if you allow some to intimidate others into silence, you end up with emergent limitations on speech that are actually more restrictive than disallowing intimidating speech. So a commitment to free speech leads one to implement moderation or censorship to some degree (and conversely, a commitment against any moderation or censorship becomes an implicit acceptance of other people placing limitations on speech).

I think it's interesting that there seems to be a connection between these principles in very different domains.

Given we are talking about jamming a repeater in a rather extreme orbit, you have to account for the speed of light delay. By the time a bad actor gets news that a message they don't like is being transmitted and starts up the jammer the broadcast may already be over (assuming its a data transmission that comes in bursts of packets)