| ▲ | cuuupid 2 hours ago |
| Not missing the forest for the trees, this effectively means in 3-5 months China will drop open source models that are every bit as capable and dangerous as current day Mythos except with no safeguards. And the only companies safe from this are the large corporations that shook hands with Anthropic? Because Fable doesn't seem to have actual safeguards, more like 'if you talk about this you will be talking to Opus.' It doesn't guard against offensive use, it prevents all use (offensive AND defensive). Rationalists are inventing oligopolies from first principles, absolutely incredible things happening in SF |
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| ▲ | hootz 2 hours ago | parent | next [-] |
| My bet is that Mythos is still over-hyped and the cybersecurity fear and guardrails are mostly marketing to force company partnerships through Glasswing and get public attention. |
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| ▲ | Flere-Imsaho 27 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | The UK gov disagrees with you: https://arstechnica.com/ai/2026/04/uk-govs-mythos-ai-tests-h... https://www.aisi.gov.uk/blog/our-evaluation-of-claude-mythos... | |
| ▲ | miohtama 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Mythos is from the same guy who did "GPT-2 is too dangerous to release" https://naokishibuya.github.io/blog/2022-12-30-gpt-2-2019/ | | |
| ▲ | oceansky 2 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | He was kinda right. Lawyers, doctors, students, teachers. Lots of people using GPT models carelessly in harmful ways. | | |
| ▲ | alasano 44 minutes ago | parent [-] | | Obviously not what he meant at the time but hilarious(ly sad) in retrospect. |
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| ▲ | uselessTA 10 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | The claim I remember was that releasing it would start an arms race for AGI, which was absolutely true | |
| ▲ | killerstorm 43 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | "Malicious use" means spam, propaganda bots, etc. It's nice to give people who work on spam filters some heads-up. | |
| ▲ | InsideOutSanta an hour ago | parent | prev [-] | | People quote the "GPT-2 is too dangerous to release" thing as if it were wrong, but given all the slop all over social media and how it's used to create division and attack social cohesion, he was clearly right. |
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| ▲ | bel8 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | It worked for OpenAI when GPT 3 was deemed too dangerous to be released. This is just a spin of that. | | |
| ▲ | hootz 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | I still remember it. "Open"AI going API-only because GPT-3 is really really dangerous, so forget the Open in our name and all of that, you can't download our models anymore and must request access to them because they pose a THREAT. Fast forward to today and GPT-3 has laughable performance. | | |
| ▲ | shoeb00m an hour ago | parent [-] | | Even back then there were plenty of people who got fooled by AI generated articles. It's easier to spot AI writing now because we are so used to it. They were right to be concerned; not that it achieved much since oss models run laps around gpt-3 now. | | |
| ▲ | hootz an hour ago | parent [-] | | But it seems like that was not genuine concern, but instead a tactic to pivot to closed models and an API service with an excuse to do so, breaking the public's expectation that they would be a non-profit making open models, like their name implies. |
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| ▲ | geerlingguy 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Bingo. "We had to do extra work to make this safe because it's so advanced and dangerous..." how many times can they trot out that line before it loses its effect entirely? | | |
| ▲ | copperx an hour ago | parent | next [-] | | Only three times, if fables are right. | | | |
| ▲ | aesthesia an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | I mean, they do actually describe what that extra work was, and people elsewhere in this thread are complaining about the effects of those safeguards. So it's not like this is purely empty rhetoric. | | |
| ▲ | zem 35 minutes ago | parent [-] | | people are not questioning whether they did the work, they are questioning whether the work was really necessary (i.e. if mythos is really so good that it needs safeguards to prevent malicious actors from using it) |
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| ▲ | OtomotO an hour ago | parent | prev [-] | | With homo "sapiens" "sapiens"? A few decades at least. |
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| ▲ | whazor 18 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | I think all models can find vulnerabilities if read the entire code base. Or intelligently combine parts of the codebase. Especially with test loops. | |
| ▲ | CSSer 41 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Yes, and "in collaboration with the U.S. Government" feels like a very gross ploy at appeal to authority. You don't need Mythos or really any SotA frontier model to make malware or do extensive penetration testing/reconnaissance already. Sure, Mythos might be faster/more efficient, but the cat has been out of the bag for awhile. Even the terminology "infrastructure providers" practically screams "Enterprise leads". | |
| ▲ | teaearlgraycold 41 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | I know a security researcher at Google with access to Mythos. He says it's the "real deal" and that "there are career plans I had that are no longer viable". | |
| ▲ | ls612 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | And to ensure that only USG-approved entities are allowed to secure their code. |
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| ▲ | mpeg 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| It's not even very usable... I tried 2 different chats and both eventually got stopped due to the safeguards One was a piece of code I gave it to improve, it did so and then started writing tests, some of which tested security so the safeguards triggered Another was one of the cryptography puzzles I use as new model tests, which are hard to oneshot and there's no public solution anywhere, it completely refused to even try to solve it |
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| ▲ | gavinray 37 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | I tried 2 chats and it declined both. - 1st chat asked about a minor shoulder injury most likely mechanisms - 2nd chat asked about optimal bloodwork testing markers | | |
| ▲ | kranke155 24 minutes ago | parent [-] | | it seems to dislike biological chats. Rejected me on a chat that I am running with 4.8 as well on a rare condition I have. |
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| ▲ | CSSer 39 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Oh joy. A model whose safeguards make it prone towards code that make your systems less safe. How brilliant! | |
| ▲ | Erem 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | So the degradation to Opus 4.8 from the article isn't happening in practice? | | |
| ▲ | mtkd an hour ago | parent | next [-] | | No, you get a AUP violation and have to manually swap the model (I had same issue, just asked it to check some code that 4.8 had modified earlier in day) | |
| ▲ | andai an hour ago | parent | prev [-] | | Maybe that's only in the chat UI, and not the API? |
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| ▲ | himata4113 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| They're trained in a model class likely in 2t to 3t range. It's very unlikely that chinese labs have access to gpu systems capable of training models like that, let alone serving them. This requires proprietary room-scale systems which fetch a huge premium over typical 10 slot systems. I am sure that they can develop their own equivlient version of such clusters in around 1 year though. Distilling fabel 5 will also go a long way. |
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| ▲ | logicprog 2 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | DSv4 is nearly in the 2t range, but yes you're generally right | | |
| ▲ | himata4113 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | MoE experts were likely trained independently / in a sparse format. Training anything beyond 2t on typical systems would be infuriantingly slow, you could do 4t on nvidias room-scale solution, but for a reasonable training speed / batch size it caps around 3t. | | |
| ▲ | sosodev 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | Do you have any resources to share regarding independent expert training? I was under the impression that it's not feasible. | | |
| ▲ | himata4113 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | concept is similar to how it works in inference, instead of performing regressive writes to the entire model you run the whole model, but part of the model can live in system memory and get swapped in/out on demand. So only XB parameters are active in training. edit: I am not really sure if it works like that. I haven't looked too deep into deepseek v4 pro specifically. |
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| ▲ | OtomotO an hour ago | parent | prev [-] | | Ah, American Hubris ... I don't blame you, Hollywood is the world's greatest propaganda machinery of all times. |
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| ▲ | gck1 12 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| There's also a reality where China does develop Mythos-level model but stops releasing the weights. That reality is much scarier. |
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| ▲ | sosodev 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| I wonder if model distillation will continue to work as well as it has. Given hidden reasoning, the ever expanding number of expected capabilities, a serious compute shortage, the looming possibility of model collapse, and dramatically higher API costs I would guess that it's getting much harder to do. |
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| ▲ | gck1 2 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | You should check out some Chinese forums. There are services selling gateways/proxies for all major models at fraction of the official rates. Likely reselling subscriptions, or some other form of abuse. I've seen people posting screenshots of billions of tokens consumed where they paid next to nothing. These same gateways are likely also reselling the data to Chinese labs, because TLS has to terminate at the gateway level. | |
| ▲ | sourcecodeplz an hour ago | parent | prev [-] | | Asian labs generated synthetic datasets from UBS labs but also innovated with technology. Now it is harder to get the thinking traces AND Anthropic is recorded to poison it as well. Thus Asian labs will have to generate their own data sets, which with the huuuuge usage boom from deepseek, mimo, kimi, etc, they will be able to. |
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| ▲ | dmantis 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Isn't that a good thing in a way? If everyone has the weapon and defense at the same time, we will fix security holes and live safer lifes instead of having some three letter agencies and military backdoors in everything. Pandora box is open anyway. It's better now for everyone to have the same power rather than a few national states. |
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| ▲ | lebovic 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | Not sure this holds, sadly. I spent a few months reporting serious security bugs as model capabilities took off earlier this year, and only ~half were fixed. The unfixed bugs were just as critical as the fixed ones; sometimes they were even two similarly critical bugs at the same company, and only one would be fixed! On your other point, the government still has systemic leverage and can compel access, so this doesn't remove that risk. That doesn't mean this is the end of the world, and some balance of power is usually good. But I do think it will still increase the capabilties of rogue actors and their net harm. |
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| ▲ | jstummbillig 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| I wonder where the trees are. In this thread nobody appears to actually be talking about the model. |
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| ▲ | FergusArgyll 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| I think we're about to see a big relative drop-off of open models vs closed. I don't think there'll be an open model that competes with Mythos for ~2 years. Even OpenAI and Google are struggling to get this kind of performance. If the distillation defenses are any good + chip controls prevent China from training massive models, it's over. |
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| ▲ | Daishiman 5 minutes ago | parent [-] | | I think the Chinese have identified this gap and are working overtime on sovereign inference tech including chips. |
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| ▲ | elAhmo an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Oh please let’s stop with the Mythos “it’s dangerous” PR talk. Its obvious Anthropic used it to hype things up and that’s about it. |
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| ▲ | deaton 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Oh they might try to put in place safeguards, but Qwen has had no problem being abliterated |
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| ▲ | xdennis 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| > every bit as capable and dangerous as current day Mythos except with no safeguards Not quite. They will definitely have "no criticism of China/communism" safeguards. |
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| ▲ | hootz 2 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | People can work around those if they are open-weight. | |
| ▲ | surgical_fire 32 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | And, thankfully, I never needed to have a discussion on Chinese politics with LLM in all the myriad of uses I had for it. | |
| ▲ | xyzsparetimexyz an hour ago | parent | prev [-] | | Trying asking fable is Israel is committing a genocide |
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| ▲ | m3kw9 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| 3-5 months is a long time and they are pretty useless on arrival because the frontier models are so good, that it's hard to go back even if it's way cheaper. Your work flow is adapted to that level of intelligence for months. |
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| ▲ | hootz 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | That doesn't match my experience at all. I can't see myself saying in 6 months that the current model I am using is useless, that makes no sense. In fact, I did go back to DeepSeek V4 Flash for most of my problems as it is way cheaper and there is no need to use SOTA for absolutely everything. |
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| ▲ | soledades 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| > Rationalists are inventing oligopolies from first principles, absolutely incredible things happening in SF. Based. |
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| ▲ | ibejoeb an hour ago | parent | prev [-] |
| I don't think China has any incentive to arm the rest of the world with highly capable models that can be used against them. Undoubtedly they will continue with the arms race, but they will preserve the best stuff for their own use. |
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| ▲ | james2doyle an hour ago | parent [-] | | I think the stronger incentive is undermining/undercutting the Western AI companies. Given what we have seen, any model can be used/convinced to do harm so that is just part of the game | | |
| ▲ | ibejoeb an hour ago | parent [-] | | I agree, depending on how much of this is marketing and how much is actual capability. It's one thing to undercut models that finish writing assignments for lazy students. If this actually identifies vulns and writes exploits, or if it designs bioweapons, those are pretty different. Those are actual weapons, and I don't think they're going to arm the adversary. |
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