Absolutely, and we definitely agree this particular attack is "lame" in the sense of not allowing CVE, etc.

But, we're working on a lot of these (as we encounter them in developing Tritium), and the point really is just to demonstrate that LLMs can be blind to ineffective implementations of the specs and other tricks.

As mentioned in the accompanying LegalQuants post, we see a lot of these available in the pipelines of applications like Claude for Legal, Harvey, Legora and others.

The most nefarious case here requires crafting a number of custom fonts to do character-swapping. It's less discoverable but may be sanctionable to your point.

But bear in mind this particular "attack" was vibe coded in a day or two and most of the frontier models fail to pick up on it. As "AI native" firms come on line, and aim to be increasingly end-to-end automated, these will become real legal issues.

And there will be a lot of them available.

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minimaltom 2 hours ago | parent [-]

It seems like the main attack scenario for this + legal AI would be during discovery: if opposing counsel gave you a poisoned PDF, and you threw it into one of these products to help you sift through it and got bad answers.

However, wouldnt this be a rather risky move? Courts authorized the discovery, so I imagine the judge might loose their marbles and throw the hammer at them if this came to light.

	▲	piker an hour ago \| parent [-]
		Yes, this particular vector is probably better in contracting than discovery. There is a duty of candor to the court and court rules that might come into play. In the case of contracting the attacker would be exposed to the jurisdiction's law of contracts. That might call it a "misrepresentation" or fraudulent thus making the contract void or voidable, but it's not clear "your honor I never read the contract but my LLM told me it was okay to sign" is a great argument either.